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RECENT CASES
COURTS
RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS
As a general proposition judicial decisions are said to
enunciate the law as it has always existed. Hence decisions
have retroactive effect in all but a few types of civil cases.
Recognition by judges that the decision in a given case will
affect not only the rights of the parties before them and
the rights of future litigants but that it will also operate
retroactively to affect legal relations already crystallized is
doubtless a factor which influences that decision. Thus the
United States Supreme Court in a problem of current im-
portance,1 has refused to overrule a long-standing interpre-
tation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, quite possibly because of the effect that any new
interpretation would have on the system of law administration
which the states have built up.2 In a recent case the Supreme
Court of Indiana has parted with theory and refused to
give a decision retroactive effect. In its effort to avoid the
confusion which would attend retroactivity s it is probable
that the court has created a new source of confusion to
plague the Indiana Bar.
The city officials of Indianapolis were required by the
"Second Skip Election Law"4 to serve a year in office in
1. Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge, dissenting in Adam-
son v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 68, 123 (1947), expressed their
belief that the first ten amendments to the Constitution of the
United States should be read into the Fourteenth Amendment.
These same four justices reaffirmed their position dissenting in
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U. S. 640, 677 (1948).
2. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Adamson v. California,
332 U. S. 46, 59, 64 (1947): "Even the boldest innovator would
shrink from suggesting to more than half the States that they
may no longer initiate prosecutions without indictment by grandjury, or that thereafter all the States of the Union must furnish
a jury of 12 for every case involving a claim above $20."
3. "To give it [the case of In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 193 N. E. 865
(1935)] that effect [retroactive operation] would introduce a com-
manding element of uncertainty amounting to utter, chaos and
confusion as to what the fundamental law of the state now is
and what it has been during the ninety-six years past, since the
adoption of the present constitution. It is never the intention of
courts to produce such an uncertainty and we do not believe such
an intention should be read into the In re Todd opinion." Swank
v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d 535, 540-541 (Ind. 1948).
4. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) § 29-4312.
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addition to their regular 4-year terms. The common council
of Indianapolis increased the officials' salaries for the entire
year." Plaintiff taxpayers sued on behalf of all city and
county taxpayers to recover these increases in salaries. The
officials' demurrer to the complaint was sustained. The
taxpayers appealed, asserting that an Indiana statute forbade
salary increases "during the term for which such officer was
elected;'6 and that Article XV, Section 2 of the Indiana
Constitution by virtue of an amendment proposed and voted
upon in 1926 also forbade the increase.7 Although the Gov-
ernor in 1926 issued a proclamation that the proposed amend-
ment had not passed, the taxpayers argued that it had be-
come effective under the ruling of In re Todd, a case decided
in 1945, which changes the standard used in determining
whether a proposed amendment has been adopted.8 The
Indiana Supreme Court rejected the taxpayers' contentions,
holding that the statute was not applicable and that In re
Todd did not operate retroactively to validate the proposed
1926 amendment. Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d 535 (Ind.
1948).
The court's holding that the statute was not applicable
was based on the reasoning that the extra year served by
5. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) § 48-223, amending IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 48-1223, allowed the common councils
of cities having a population of over 250,000 to increase the salar-
ies of their city officials to a prescribed amount.
6. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 49-1103 provides: "The salary
of any officer elected to any elective township, city, county or
state office in the state of Indiana, shall not be increased during
the term for which such officer was elected, and this act shall
be construed to be a part of any law enacted for the change or
increase of any such salaries." (Emphasis added).
7. IND. CONST. Art. XV, § 2 provides: "When the duration of any
office is not provided for by this constitution, it may be declared
by law; and if not so declared, such office shall be held during
the pleasure of the authority making the appointment. But the
general assembly shall not create any office, the tenure of which
shall be longer than four (4) years." The amendment submitted
to the electorate on November 2, 1926 would have changed the
period at the end of the section to a comma and added the follow-
ing: "nor shall the term of office or salary of any officer fixed
by this Constitution or by law be increased during the term for
which such officer was elected or appointed."
8. IND. CONST. Art. XVI, § 1 provides that as part of the process to
be followed in amending the constitution the proposed amendment
shall be submitted "to the electors of the State; and if a majority
of said electors shall ratify the same, such amendment or amend-
ments shall become a part of the Constitution." The Todd case
altered the interpretation which had previously been given to the
quoted language.
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the officials was not a part of their elective term. The
officials were entitled to hold over for the additional year
under Article XV, Section 3 of the Indiana Constitution,9
which adds to each term of an office created by law an addi-
tional tenure of office-until the official's successor is elected
and qualified. The hold-over provision of Article XV, Sec-
tion 3 cannot be considered to add to the elective term, how-
ever; for Article XV, Section 2 prohibits elective terms of
over four years.'0 Article XV, Section 3 only provides for a
"contingent, defeasible term."1  Thus the defendant officials
were not serving in their "elective" terms when their salaries
were increased, and, as the statute has reference only to
elective terms, it was not applicable.
The court's disposition of the question of whether the
proposed 1926 amendment has become a part of the Indiana
Constitution led it to consider the general problem: Do
judicial decisions, and more specifically, decisions construing
the constitution, operate retroactively? In 1926 the long-
recognized rule was that a proposed amendment had to re-
ceive a majority of the votes of all voters going to the polls
in order to become effective. According to this standard
the proposed 1926 amendment did not become effective, since
many voters going to the polls did not vote at all on the
amendment and it therefore failed to receive the approval
of a majority of those voting. Of those who did vote upon
the amendment a majroity favored its adoption. In 1935,
In re Todd12 changed the long-recognized rule, and held that
a proposed amendment must receive only a majority of the
votes cast for or against the amendment in order to become
effective. According to this standard the proposed 1926
amendment would .have become effective.13  The taxpayers
9. IND. CONST. Art. XV, § 3: "Whenever it is provided in this Consti-
tution, or in any law which may be hereafter passed, that any
officer, other than a member of the General Assembly, shall hold
his office for any given term, the same shall be construed to
mean, that such officer shall hold his office for such term, and
until his successor shall have been elected and qualified."
10. See note 7 supra; see Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d 535, 538, 539
(Ind. 1948), and cases there cited; cf. State eX Tel. Fares v.
Karger, 77 N. E.2d 746 (Ind. 1948), noted in 24 IND. L. J. 111
(1948).
11. State eX Tel. Carson v. Harrison, 113 Ind. 434, 16 N. E. 384 (1887).
12. 208 Ind. 168, 193 N. E. 865 (1935).
13. The proposed amendment to Article XV, § 2 was submitted to the
voters at the general election on November 2, 1926. The total
number of votes cast in favor of the amendment was 182,456; the
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in the Swank case argued that the rule announced in the
Todd case was retroactive in application and that the pro-
posed 1926 amendment had thereby been effected. The court
refused to adopt the taxpayers' position, but the opinion is
likely to create confusion in the application and content of a
fundamental doctrine of the Indiana law.
That fundamental doctrine is the well known rule of
the common law regarding the retroactive effect of a decision
which changes an existing rule of law: "If it be found that
the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is
declared, not that such a decision was bad law, but that it
was not law. . .. -14 Under this view, an overruling decision
must operate retrospectively, for the overruled decision was,
in effect, non-existent. The harsh results of this so-called
"Declaratory Theory" soon led the courts to establish an
exception to the rule. It is stated that contracts made or
property acquired in reliance"5 upon the overruled decision
will not be affected by the overruling decision. 16 The effect
of establishing this exception is to admit that the Declaratory
Theory does not conform to fact, i.e., although the theory is
that an overruled decision was never law, the fact is that
if a person relied upon it to acquire property or enter into
contracts, it operates just as if it had been law. This classi-
cal paradox has given rise to a realistic view opposed to the
Declaratory Theory. The more realistic theory, advocated by
several eminent writers,i7 is that judges do in fact "make
total number of votes cast against the amendment was 177,748,
and the total number of votes cast at the general election was
1,952,994. Legislative Bureau Pamphlet entitled "Constitution of
the State of Indiana and of the United States," issued June, 1947,
p. 30, n.56.
14. 1 BL. Comm. *69-70.
15. Although the courts have required that there be reliance upon the
overruled decision, as a practical matter there is very little sub-
stance to this part of the rule. If the contracts were made or the
property acquired during the time when the overruled decision
was still "good law" the courts have assumed an element of re-
liance. See cases cited notes 16, 24 infra. But cf. Thompson v.
Henry, 153 Ind. 56, 54 N. E. 109 (1899), where the court refused
to apply the exception because the conveyance of certain property
was not known to have been completed during the existence of the
overruled decision.
16. Gross v. Board of Comm'rs., 158 Ind. 531, 64 N. E. 25 (1902);
Stephenson v. Boody, 139 Ind. 60, 38 N. E. 331 (1894); Haskett
v. Maxey, 134 Ind. 182, 33 N. E. 358 (1892).
17. See GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 219-222, 235
236; Holmes, J. dissenting in Kuhn v. Fairmount Coal Co., 215
U. S. 349? 370? 371 (1909) ; Note, 17 COL. L. REv. 595, n.8 (1917).
[Vol. 24
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law," or at least that a judicial decision is law until it is
overruled, and that consequently no overruling decisions
should be applied retrospectively.
The court in the instant case discusses the Declaratory
Theory with its contract-property rights exception and states
that this is the prevailing rule and the view followed by
Indiana. However, the court emphasizes that some advocates
of the Declaratory Theory contend that the exception should
not be limited to contract and property rights, but that all
rights, including the right to rely on the announced decisions
of a court, should be protected.1 8
The concurring opinion, conscious of the break with
theory,1 attempts to bring the case within limits of precedent
by explaining that the right protected is the right to have
a vote counted "under the law as then announced." Whe-
ther this judicial struggle leaves the theory unscathed can
best be determined by an examination of the decisions
which enunciate the Declaratory Theory.
The Declaratory Theory has been a part of Indiana law
for at least seventy-five years . 2  While at first no exception
to the rule was recognized,21 the case of Hasket v. Maxey,2 2
following the lead of several United States Supreme Court
cases,2 3 excepted vested personal contract and property rights.
The Hasket case has been followed without variation until the
case under discussion. 24
18. See Freeman, The Protection Afforded Against the Retroactive
Operation of an Overruling Decision, 18 COL. L. REV. 230, 251
(1918).
19. O'Malley, 3. "From such viewpoint I can see that the broadening
of the exception will do much to create certainty in the basic law,
a thing to be desired. Reason and necessity seem to press for a
slight enlargement ;of the exception to that rule." (Emphasis
added) Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d. 535, 545, 546 (Ind. 1948).
20. Sumner v. Beeler, 50 Ind. 341 (1875).
21. Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570 (1884).
22. 134 Ind. 182, 38 N. E. 358 (1892).
23. Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 361 (1885) ; Taylor v. Ypsilanti,
105 U. S. 72 (1881); Douglass v. County of Pike, 101 U. S. 677
(1879); Alcott v. Supervisor, 16 Wall. 578 (U. S. 1872); Have-
meyer v. Iowa Company, 3 Wall. 294 (U. S. 1865); Gelpcke v.
Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (U. S. 1863); Insurance Co. v. Debolt, 16
How. 415 (U. S. 1853).
24. Stephenson v. Boody, 139 Ind. 60, 38 N. E. 331 (1894); Town of
Hardinsburg v. Cravens, 148 Ind. 1, 47 N. E. 153 (1897); Center
School Township v. State, 150 Ind. 168, 49 N. E. 961 (1898);
Byrum v. Henderson, 151 Ind. 102, 51 N. E. 94 (1898); Addison
School Township v. City of Shelbyville, 21 Ind. App. 707, 52 N. E.
19481
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Quite obviously the Swank case has, on its facts, broken
with precedent. Whatever right it may be that the court
was protecting when it refused retroactive application to
the Todd case, it is not the sort of right involved in past
cases in which exceptions to the Declaratory Theory have
been found. As respects civil suits, "vested right" has
been applied in the past exclusively to denote contract
rights and rights relative to the ordinary subject matter of
property. Such vested rights arise between individuals, or
between an individual and a proprietary agency of the state,
where the parties enter into legal relations relying on ajudicial decision as governing some phase of their relation-
ship. Not only would the "right" which the concurring
opinion discovers not fit this definition, but it must be con-
ceded that there was in the Swank case no right requiring
the application of the exception to the Declaratory Theory.
This is the basis of the dissent,25 and the Todd case confirms
that reasoning.26  It follows that the majority has in fact,
if not in words, disregarded the Declaratory Theory in
deciding the case. 27
105 (1898); Gross v. Board of Comm'rs., 158 Ind. 531, 64. N. E.25 (1902); Ruf v. Mueller, 49 Ind. App. 7, 96 N. E. 612 (1911).
25. Young and Starr, JJ., dissenting in instant case at 545: "In the
case before us no vested property or contract rights are involved
and no reason for not applying the general rule appears."
26. "When the overruling of a previous decision involves only aquestion of public interest in no way affecting private interests
the rule of stare decisis does not control. . . . Consequently wefeel no hesitancy in considering the merits of the constitutionalquestion presented." In re Todd, 208 Ind. 168, 172, 193 N. E. 865,
866 (1935).
27. The court could have avoided the retroactivity issue altogether ifit had so desired. In a similar Indiana case it was assumed thatthe proposed 1926 amendment was in force, and the court heldthat salaries fixed by an administrative board were not within
the scope of the amendment. Benton County Council v. State ex
rel Sparks, 224 Ind. 114, 35 N. E.2d 308 (1945). See also Board
of Comm'rs. v. Crowe, 214 Ind. 437, 15 N. E.2d 1016 (1938),
where the court assumed the 1926 amendment to be in force. The
reasoning of the Benton County case, which construed the pro-posed 1926 .amendment narrowly, applies equally to the facts of
the Swank. case where the officials' salaries were increased bythe common council, an administrative board. Under that reason-ing the proposed 1926 amendment, even if in force, would not
change the result of the Swank case.
t Even without such narrow interpretation of the meaning of
the proposed 1926 amendment ,it would probaly not affect the
additional term given by the "Second Skip Election Law," IND.
STAT. ANN. (Burns Supp. 1945) § 29-4312, as applied to theinstant case. Both the proposed 1926 amendment and the statute
considered by the court prohibited salary increases during the
[vo1. 24
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It is clear that the majority felt the court was committed
to the Declaratory Theory, and so used a familiar legal de-
vice: it expanded the concept of what vested rights are in-
cluded within the exception to the Declaratory Theory and
paid lip service to precedent, at the same time avoiding the
result which the Declaratory Theory would dictate. The
considerations which moved the court to indulge in this
legal contortion are a matter of conjecture. Probably it
was not solely for the purposes of the particular case, for
even if the amendment had been accepted as in effect the
result need not have been different.28 To validate the pro-
posed 1926 amendment would entail the validation of three
other proposed amendments 29 which received a majority of
the votes cast for or against them, but not of all votes cast
at the election at which they were submitted. Perhaps the
court felt that the validation of all these amendments would
result in litigation and confused administration of the law.30
term for which an officer was elected. Presumably the court
would apply the same reasoning (see supra, 3rd paragraph this
note) to both situations. Thus, the result of the case would not
have been different had the Declaratory Theory been applied in
all of its original vigor.
28. See note 7 supra.
29. The three proposed amendments to the Indiana Constitution which
received a majority of the votes cast for or against them but did not
receive a majority of the votes cast at the general election were:(1) A proposal to amend Article VII, § 1, to provide that the
Supreme Court should consist of not less than five nor
more than eleven members, submitted in 1900. Total num-
ber of votes cast for the amendment, 314,710; total number
of votes cast against the amendment, 178,960; and total
number of votes cast at the general election, 664,094.(2) A proposal to amend Article XIV, § 2 to provide for a
classification of townships, counties, towns, and cities for
the purpose of registration, submitted in 1926. Total num-
ber of votes cast for the amendment, 198,579; total number
of votes cast against the amendment, 184,684; and total
number of votes cast at the general election, 1,052,994.
(3) A proposal to amend Article X by providing that the
legislature could levy an income tax, submitted in 1926 and
again in 1932. Total number of votes cast for the amend-
ment in 1926 was 239,734; total number of votes cast against
the amendment, 212,224; and total number of votes cast at
the general election, 1,052,994. In 1932 the total number
of votes cast for the amendment was 701,045; total num-
ber of votes cast against the amendment, 209,076; and
total number of votes cast at the general election, 1,600,484.
Legislative Bureau Pamphlet entitled "Constitution of the
State of Indiana and of the United States," issued June,
1949, pp. 20, n.39, 31, n.58, 26, n.47.
30. Cf. Brief for Appellants, pp. 43, 44, Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d
535 (Ind. 1948), asserting that all these amendments have been
19481
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Actually, it is difficult to conceive of any administrative or
legal difficulties which might arise from the validation of
the four proposed amendments. The proposed 1926 amend-
ment would, it appears, do no more than reiterate the statute
forbidding salary increases during an official's regular term
of office. The other three proposed amendments are merely
permissive; giving the legislature power to levy an income
tax, redistrict the state for registration, and increase the
number of judges on the Supreme Court. The legislature
could avoid administrative difficulty by non-exercise or care-
ful exercise of their powers. Thus, any policy considerations
behind the present decision are, at best, highly elusive,
Although the Swank case serves as a "reminder that a
decision overruling a constitutional precedent may be made
prospective if circumstances warrant,"3' 1 it also warns that
if a court truly wishes to avoid confusion in the law the
proper time for it to designate an overruling decision as
prospective only is when making such decision.3 2 That the
court's jurisprudential excursion into a discussion of the
Declaratory Theory will create confusion in Indiana doctrine
seems inevitable.
Indeed, as the Swank case dissenters point out,33 the
Swank and the Todd decisions seem irreconcilably at odds
since the same "right," viz., the "right" of voters to have
their votes given effect under the existing interpretation of
the constitution, was before the court in each case.3 4  Al-
considered effective since In re Todd, that the legislature has
acted under its authority, and that confusion and litigation will
result if they are declared ineffective.
31. Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947--;8, 16 U. oF
Cm. L. REV. 1, 21 (1948).
32. Mr. Justice Cardozo, Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil &
Refining Co., 287 U. S. 358, 364 (1932): "A state in defining the
limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself
between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward." To do so is not a denial of due process protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment.
33. Starr and Young, JJ., dissenting in instant case at 543: "It seems
to us that it cannot be held that the amendment involved in the
case before us failed (it having received a majority of the votes
cast for and against it) without overruling the In re Todd case,
which we are unwilling to do."
34. The Todd case (1935) involved a so-called "Lawyer Amendment"
to the constitution which had been submitted at the general elec-
tion of 1932 and received a majority of the votes cast for or
against it but not a majority of the votes cast at the election.
This amendment allowed the Supreme Court to prescribe rules
for admittance to the bar. Previously "good moral character"
[Vol. 24
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though the Todd case permitted retroactive application and
did not protect the "right," the Swank case denied retroactive
application and granted the protection. Yet the majority in
the Swank case expressly allowed the Todd decision to stand."
Confusion must follow too from allowing the Declaratory
Theory to remain, in name, as a principle of Indiana law
while creating an exception so large and ill-defined that
accurate prediction of future decisions becomes impossible
and the principle becomes, in truth, no longer controlling.
Either rigid adherence to the Declaratory Theory as it has
long been understood, or complete abandonment of it would
have satisfied the need for reasonable certainty in the law.
If the Supreme Court feels that the time has come to reject
as unreal a theory founded upon Blackstonian concepts of
law, a frank decision to that effect seems preferable to a
resort to the vagueness of words.36
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION
EFFECT OF STATUTORY LIMITATION OF TERM
OF OFFICE CREATED BY LEGISLATURE
Hessler, the trustee-elect of Center Township, Vander-
burgh County, Indiana, died before qualifying and taking
the oath of office. Karger, the incumbent trustee, had
served in office for eight consecutive years. The statutes
provide that "no person shall be eligible to hold the office
of township trustee for more than eight years in any period
of twelve years."' The Board of County Commissioners
passed a resolution finding Karger ineligible to continue in
office because he had served the statutory maximum. The
Board proceeded to find that a vacancy existed and appointed
Fares to the office.2  Upon the refusal of Karger to sur-
and the ability to vote were the only qualifications. The court
in the Todd case held that the "Lawyer Amendment" had been
passed. Certainly the voters had the right to have their votes
counted in accordance with the existing law in the Todd case
if they had that right in the Swank case.
35. Swank v. Tyndall, 78 N. E.2d 535, 541 (Ind. 1948).
36. A subsequent case indicates that the Swank case will be used
merely to exemplify the Declaratory Theory. State v. Burch, 80
N. E.2d 294 (Ind. 1948).
1. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns Repl. 1943) § 65-101.
2. IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns RepI. 1943) § 65-106 provides that all
vacancies in the office of township trustee "shall" be filled by
1948]
